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Economists (and others) have generally 
had little success in estimating the social 
effects of different investments, and,
unfortunately, education is no exception.
—Gary S. Becker, Human Capital
he private monetary return to education is one
of the most widely studied empirical magni-
tudes in economics. The consensus estimate is
that the private financial return to acquiring an educa-
tion is quite substantial—in the range of 8–15 percent
per year of schooling. That is, an additional year of
schooling typically raises an individual’s earning power
between 8 percent and 15 percent. Recent data indicate
that four years of college education raise earnings by
about 65 percent, a return of around 13 percent per year,
compounded.
These returns are at least as large as typical returns on
other forms of risky investment. No surprise there, as
people have many ways to invest, and we expect returns
to equalized across competing alternatives. Yet the mag-
nitude of the private returns to investments in schooling
presents an economic puzzle: If schooling provides such
substantial returns to those who acquire it, why is pub-
lic funding of education virtually universal? That is, if
the financial rewards are so large, why do governments
feel the need to subsidize it?
To an economist, a positive case for government sub-
sidies to education, or public provision of education (or
anything else), requires the social benefits of schooling
to be larger than the private ones. In the presence of
such an “externality,” individual actors— who weigh pri-
vate benefits and costs in deciding whether another year
of schooling is worthwhile—will choose “too little” edu-
cation compared to the social optimum. They ignore the
social benefits received by others in making their deci-
sions. Then government can improve things by subsidiz-
ing schooling or by other policies (such as minimum
schooling requirements) that encourage individual
investments in education. The near ubiquity of public
educations suggests that these external benefits of edu-
cation may be important. Yet as Becker’s comment from
30 years ago indicates, hard evidence for a difference
between private and social benefits of education is hard
to come by.
These issues are also important for understanding the
role of education and other forms of human capital in
the process of economic development. Do countries or
regions that invest heavily in human capital—say, by rais-
ing the average educational attainment of their work-
forces—enjoy unusually high rates of economic growth?
The answer to this question appears to be yes, as I will
show here. From this, it may appear that the path to
local and national economic development is through
public policies that encourage investments in education.
This view would receive compelling support from evi-
dence that the social returns to education—the measur-
able impact of raising average schooling of workers on
productivity and earnings—exceeds the private return,
and a number of recent empirical studies have argued
this is the case. This paper provides contrary evidence,
however, that indicates the social returns to schooling as
reflected in productivity and earnings are not much
larger than private ones. The conclusion is that a case for
proactive public policies to encourage education does
not get much support from data on growth of incomes
and productivity.
PRIVATE AND SOCIAL RETURNS: 
A TAXONOMY
The efficiency of market outcomes typically turns on
whether private benefits and costs are equal to their
social values. The private returns to schooling can take
many forms. The most obvious and most studied bene-
fit is higher earnings, which economists typically inter-
pret as a measure of the greater productivity of more
educated individuals. But there are a number of plausi-
ble nonmonetary returns as well. Education may also
increase productivity in nonmarket activities, such as
home production; it may make parents into more effi-
cient producers of children’s human capital; and it may
lead to more informed and effective consumption deci-
sions. Other research shows that more educated indi-
viduals live longer—which itself has substantial eco-
nomic value—and they report better health at any 
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particular age. Finally, education is itself often a con-
sumption good, which, in turn, enables the consump-
tion and enjoyment of human capital goods such as
information, literature, and ideas. All of these benefits of
education are enjoyed directly by the educated person,
so they are elements of “private” returns that people
would be willing to pay for.
Education Externalities
Recent economic research has emphasized the possi-
bility of a divergence between private and social returns
to education, which, in a nutshell, means that person A
may benefit from person B’s education. For example, an
additional year of schooling for B may make A more pro-
ductive. There are no consequences for efficiency when
this type of “complementarity” occurs among employees
of a firm, because the firm will take it into account in
choosing how many people like B to hire and how much
to pay them. Then the productivity effect is “internal-
ized” by the firm, and outcomes are efficient. But Lucas
(1988) and others have argued that A’s gain from the
greater education of B may be caused by social or other
interactions that occur outside of firms: for example, in
cities where ideas are “in the air.” Then B’s education
confers a benefit on A—higher productivity and earn-
ings—for which B is not compensated. Left to his own
devices, B would choose too little schooling compared
to the efficient outcome because the private value of a
year of schooling (the financial gain to B) is smaller than
its social value (the gains to A and B combined).
Government intervention in the form of subsidies or
minimal education requirements of citizens could make
things better.
In this case, an additional year of schooling raises the
level of economic activity more than its private return.
For example, if the private return to schooling is 10 per-
cent, and if average schooling in the workforce increas-
es by one year, then private returns suggest that the
economywide level of output will be 10 percent  greater,
all other things equal. But in the presence of this educa-
tional externality, the level of productivity will be even
greater—say, 12 percent higher. The difference between
the social return to a year of schooling (12 percent) and
its private return (10 percent) is a measure of the exter-
nal effect.
A related externality might affect economic growth.
Because growth is largely determined by technological
advances—new ways of doing things—and because
more educated people may be better at producing and
implementing new ideas, an increase in the level of edu-
cation in an economy may increase the rate of economic
growth. Individuals don’t take this effect into account in
making their educational choices, which can lead to too
little education compared to the social optimum.
This discussion has focused on the productivity-
enhancing effects of education, yet there are many other
channels through which individuals’ schooling choices
may have external effects on others. Social insurance pro-
grams such as Medicare and Social Security collect taxes
in order to pay for health care and retirement benefits. If
more educated people are less likely to become ill, then
additional schooling confers an external benefit on others
because educated people are likely to require tax-funded
medical care, so taxes are lower—a positive externality.
But if they also live longer, they will collect more tax-fund-
ed retirement benefits—a negative externality. Empirical
evidence also suggests that education reduces the likeli-
hood that individuals will engage in criminal activities—
a positive externality for those who are less likely to be
victims of crime. Finally, to the extent that educated indi-
viduals are better informed, there are externalities
through the political process as educated voters make
“better” decisions.
When education creates positive externalities of the
types just described, public funding or provision of
schooling, or even compulsory schooling laws, can, in
principle, move society closer to efficient outcomes. Left
to themselves, individuals would choose too little
schooling, and public participation in the process moves
things in the “right” direction.
Can the Private Value of Education Exceed Its
Social Value?
Economists are known for their ability to predict that
almost anything can happen, and this area is no excep-
tion. Following Spence (1974), models of educational
“signaling” conjecture that the private value of education
could exceed its social value because employers use an
individual’s observed education to infer unobserved,
innate characteristics, such as ability. Schooling can raise
earnings (there is a private return to schooling invest-
ment) without raising productivity (there is no social
return). Many of my MBA students at the University of
Chicago firmly believe this is why they are in school:
They are already much more productive than the next
guy, they just need our degree to prove it to employers,
who will pay them more for having an MBA. Evidence to
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least, and it has lost favor among economists as a useful
tool for analyzing educational choices or for policy analy-
sis. My evidence also indicates that this effect is unlikely
to be broadly important.
MEASURING PRIVATE RETURNS: A PRIMER
To  make progress in calibrating the social returns to
education, we need a benchmark estimate of the private
returns. I will focus on evidence regarding the private
financial returns to schooling, ignoring such issues as
the value of education as a consumption good, its
impact on health, and so on.
Estimates of the returns to schooling are typically gar-
nered from data that record individuals’ wages or earn-
ings, years of schooling, and some measure of labor mar-
ket experience. Assume that (1) the only cost of school-
ing is forgone labor market earnings while enrolled, and
(2) the percentage increase in earnings caused by an
additional year of schooling is constant over a person’s
lifetime. (These assumptions don’t do too much vio-
lence to the facts.) Then the rate of return to an addi-
tional year of schooling is equal to the percentage
increase in earnings caused by an additional year. So, if
high school graduates earn 10 percent more than peo-
ple with 11 years of education, on average, then our esti-
mate of the rate of return is 10 percent.
The workhorse statistical model represented by this
description can be written, 
(1) ln Wi = Xiβ + Siρ +ε i
where Wi is the wage of person i, Si is the person years
of completed schooling, Xi represents other observed
factors (experience and the like), and ε i represents
unobserved determinants of wages. The parameter of
interest is ρ , the private return to schooling, which is the
percentage increase in the wage due to one more year
of schooling. Equation (1) is probably the most-estimat-
ed econometric model in all of applied economics.
Versions have been estimated for virtually any country
and time period where data are available (graduate stu-
dents have to earn PhDs, you know), controlling for 
various biases. Yet for all the effort applied to this ques-
tion, the range of estimates is surprisingly small. A typi-
cal return to schooling is in the range of 5–15 percent,
depending on country and time period, with somewhat
higher returns in developing countries (Card 1999). 
As I have noted, these returns are comparable to returns
on other forms of risky investment.
The recent economic history of wages in the United
States provides a useful and important example for
understanding the determinants of the private returns
to schooling investments. Figure 1 graphs the percent-
age difference in wages between college-educated and
high school–educated men in the United States since
1963. A telling feature of the data is the “break” that
occurred around 1980: After 1980, the returns to
schooling in the United States trended steadily upward
and roughly doubled by the late 1990s. Calculating aver-
age annual rates of return from these data, the return to
a year of college education rose from 7 percent in 1979
to over 14 percent in 2000. Other evidence (not shown
here) establishes that these changes occurred at virtu-
ally all levels of measurable education and skill. For
example, the increase in relative wages was even more
pronounced among those with postgraduate educa-
tion, whose wages rose sharply relative to graduates of
four-year colleges. A large body of empirical research
indicates that these changes in the relative prices of
skilled (educated) workers are largely demand driven,
reflecting technological changes that have favored
skilled over less-skilled labor. Though I won’t go into
details here, this increase in the relative demand for
educated labor is part of a broader trend toward
increased wage inequality in the United States that
began even earlier, around 1973.
When increased demand raises the return to skills,
basic economics tells us that investment in skills will rise,
just as more houses will be built when the demand for
them rises. Here the predicted event is that more young
people will attend college because the economic returns
to a college education have risen. Figure 2 shows the
proportion young people (ages 21–25) with at least one
year of completed schooling, also beginning in 1963.
After rising rapidly in the 1960s, this form of investment
in human capital declined from the early 1970s to
1980—the period where the returns to college shown in
figure 1 also fell. Beginning in 1980, however, the frac-
tion obtaining college training steadily expanded, rising
10 percentage points by the late 1990s.
The response of educational investment illustrated in
figure 2 is important because it suggests that the “prob-
lem” of rising wage inequality contains the seeds of 
its own solution. Rising inequality is evidence of the









Figure 1: The College-High School Wage Premium
Figure 2: The Response of Educational Investment to Rising Private Returns to Schooling
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In equation (3) Sjt is the average years of schooling per
worker in country j, and Xjt is the other observable com-
ponents of skill, such as experience. The parameter γP
represents the private returns to schooling. If an addi-
tional year of schooling raises individual productivity by
10 percent (γP = 0.10), then an increase in the average
years of schooling across all workers should increase the
average productivity of workers by 10 percent as well.
But if additional education creates positive externalities,
the social return will exceed 10 percent, which shows up
as an increase in total factor productivity. This effect is
shown in equation (4), where the external benefit of an
additional year of average schooling is represented by
γE. The empirical question is whether γE > 0.
Combining equations (2)–(4) yields a tractable model
of the effects of education on economic growth:
(5) ln yjt =κj  Xjt β+ Sjt  (γP + γE) + ujt + ajt.
In equation (5), γP + γE is the social return to an addi-
tional year of schooling: the sum of the private and
external effects of schooling on productivity. So equa-
tion (5) asks whether the impact of schooling on aggre-
gate productivity is larger (or smaller) than its impact
on individual productivity.
Table 1, taken from Topel (1999) shows estimates of
γP + γE derived from a sample of 111 countries at five-
year intervals between 1960 and 1990.1 In models that
contain country and year effects, in column (3), the esti-
mated social return to schooling is 0.10 per year of school-
ing. This is in the same range as the typical estimate of 
private returns, so there is no compelling evidence for
positive educational externalities. On the other hand,
table 1 provides little comfort to those who would argue
that social returns are smaller than private ones, as
implied by signaling models of educational choice.
Estimates of equation (5) are not an explicit model of
economic growth, which can be achieved by taking first
differences within a country:
(6)  ∆ ln yjt =∆ Xjt β+ ∆ Sjt  (γP + γE) + ∆ ujt + ∆ ajt
Table 2 shows estimates for various specifications of
equations (6)—again taken from Topel (1999)—where
the growth interval is allowed to vary from five to 20
years. At a 20-year growth interval, the estimated impact
of a one-year growth in average schooling per worker on
average productivity is 0.246, which is vastly larger than
this increase in the relative price of skill that provides the
incentive for young people to invest in skills. In other
words, the solution to the problem of rising inequality is
to increase the relative supply of skilled workers, which,
in the long run, would reduce the relative price (wage) of
skilled labor. This requires investment—more people
becoming skilled. Paradoxically, government efforts to
combat rising inequality through redistributive tax poli-
cies or restrictions on wages will reduce the incentive to
invest, which can only exacerbate the underlying forces
that created inequality in the first place. The underlying
problem is the scarcity of skilled labor; rising wage and
income inequality is merely its symptom.
EDUCATIONAL EXTERNALITIES
If there are external benefits of private investments in
education—as outlined previously—then the social
returns to education will exceed the private returns.
Efforts to measure these benefits have focused on the
effects of education on productivity, income, and eco-
nomic growth, so my discussion will ignore other non-
monetary returns. We then ask, if the private return to
an additional year of schooling is, say, 10 percent, does
the social return exceed 10 percent? To answer this
question, we need a way to measure the social return,
and, sadly, measuring social returns is not as straightfor-
ward as measuring private returns.
One approach, pursued in Topel (1999) and Lange and
Topel (2004), among others, is to measure the returns to
schooling in a national income growth accounting
framework. Let yjt denote output per worker in country
j at date t, and let hjt be the corresponding average
amount of human capital (skills) per worker. With con-
stant returns to scale, Lange and Topel (1999) write out-
put per worker as
(2)  ln yjt = κj+ ln hjt+ lnTjt
where  Tjt is total factor productivity in country j.
According to equation (1), output per worker increases
when workers become more skilled (more h) or when
the state of technology in j makes workers of a given skill
more productive (more T). Now let 
(3)  ln hjt = Xjt β+ SjtγP + ujt
and
(4)  lnTjt = SjtγE + ajtNotes: t-statistics in parentheses. Based on Summers-Heston Mark 5.6 and Barro-Lee (1993) data. All models include year effects. 
Effects of ∆ Xjt are evaluated at the mean level of ln yjt.
any estimate of private returns. This estimate implies
implausibly large externalities, perhaps because other
forms of investment are correlated with growth in aver-
age years of schooling.
Evidence from Local Data: States and Cities
A number of recent studies have sought evidence of
human capital externalities from the spatial distribution
of wages in the United States. The presumption in these
studies (Rauch 1993; Acemoglu and Angrist 1999;
Moretti 2003, 2004) is that the production externalities
of education increase local wages. A prototype model of
the wage of person i working and living in locale l is
(7)  ∆ ln Wli = Xli B+ Sli γP+ SlγE + εli
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TABLE 1: THE EFFECTS OF EDUCATION ON LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 
FIXED COUNTRY EFFECTS, 1960–1990 (N=719)
(dependent variable: ∆ yjt)
5-year 10-year 
5-year 10-year 15-year 20-year growth growth
growth growth growth growth fixed effects fixed effects
(N=608) (N=290) (N=186) (N=101) (N=604) (N=290)
∆ Education: 0.115 0.115 0.155 0.246 0.022 0.086
∆ Xjt (5.07) (5.07) (5.23) (5.73) (1.32) (2.85)
Years of schooling 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.009
(4.85) (4.85) (4.59) (5.93) (1.29) (2.49)
Ln –0.004 –0.004 –0.005 –0.009 –0.043 –0.047
output/worker: (1.56) (1.56) (1.77) (2.26) (6.02) (6.03)
ln yjt ∆ Xjt x ln yjt –0.060 –0.060 –0.041 –0.025 –0.020 –0.049
(2.70) (2.70) (1.30) (0.57) (1.25) (2.00)
R2 .332 .332 .391 .399 .287 .493
_
_
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg. Years of Schooling 0.23 0.10
(22.67) (6.21)
Avg. Years of Primary Schooling 0.20 0.06
(10.28) (2.05)
Avg. Years of Secondary Schooling 0.28 0.14
(7.62) (5.76)
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects No No Yes Yes
R2 .46 .46 .58 .59
TABLE 2: THE EFFECTS OF EDUCATION ON PRODUCTIVITY AND GROWTH
FIRST-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATOR AT VARIOUS GROWTH INTERVALS
where Sl is the average years of completed schooling
for workers in l. Here the empirical question is whether
greater  average education in an area raises individual 
wages, after controlling for individual years of schooling,
Si. Evidence that γE > 0 is taken as evidence for 
externalities—the productivity of individuals is greater
when those who work around them are more educated.
Lange and Topel (2004) argue that the assumptions
needed to plausibly identify γE are unlikely to be satis-
fied, so that pretty much anything can happen. And it
does—estimates of γE from various studies are all over
the map, ranging from zero (Acemoglu and Angrist) to
about 0.40 (Moretti 2004). The former estimate means
there are noexternal benefits of education, while the The Private and Social Values of Education 53
latter means that an additional year of average schooling
raises the wage of the average worker about 50 percent.
This is simply outside the range of plausibility.
Education and the Growth in U.S. States:
1940–2000
One of the most prominent facts about American eco-
nomic growth in the second half of the twentieth centu-
ry is “convergence.” While real incomes in all areas of the
United States grew dramatically, poorer states grew faster
than rich ones, so that inequality of incomes across states
and areas declined. This pattern of growth suggests three
important questions. First, has growth in the education
of the workforce contributed to growth in real incomes?
The answer to this, almost incontestably, is yes. Second,
can we explain the spatial convergence of real incomes as
(at least in part) an outcome of convergence in levels of
schooling? Again, the answer appears to be yes. Finally,
related to externalities, has growth of education pro-
duced spillover effects that have raised productivity 
by more than the private returns to schooling? Here the
answer appears to be maybe, but the evidence is not 
very compelling.
Figure 3 provides the most compelling evidence of
convergence. It graphs the change in log real wages of
men between 1940 and 2000 against the level of wages
in 1940, based on census data.2 The pattern is pretty
obvious: Wages grew fastest in low-wage Southern
states. The range of values indicates that growth among
the poorest states in 1940 (Georgia, South Carolina, and
Mississippi) was about a twice that of the richest states
(California, Nevada, Michigan, and New Jersey).
Suggestive evidence that education played a role is
shown in figure 4, which is an identical graph for growth
in average years of schooling of the workforce. The pat-
tern is the same—states with low levels of schooling
added about twice as many additional years of schooling
over the 60-year interval as did those with the most
schooling in 1940. Inspection of the graph reveals that
the identities of the fast- and slow-growing states are
roughly the same as in figure 3: Educational levels grew
rapidly in the South, and these states were catching up
with high-education states.
Figure 3: Levels and Growth of State Wages 1940–2000Robert Topel 54
Figure 4: Levels and Growth of State Average Years of Schooling 1940–2000
Figure 5: Growth in Education and Growth in Wages 1940–2000The Private and Social Values of Education 55
The two patterns of convergence are related to one
another in figure 5, which graphs wage growth against
growth in average years of schooling. The data are 
fairly convincing that growth in schooling and growth in
wages are closely related. A simple regression of growth
in log wages on growth in schooling has a coefficient of
.22, indicating that each year of additional schooling in
a state is associated with productivity growth of over 
20 percent. Thus, the data suggest that education “dri-
ves” growth, and that the social return to education
substantially exceeds the private return. Yet growth in
education may be correlated with other unmeasured
factors that also contribute to productivity and wage
growth. Obvious candidates are local changes in the
demand for skills (though this seems unlikely over such
a long period), improvements in the quality of educa-
tion that are correlated with growth in educational
achievement (likely), and changes in the unobserved
talents of workers.
To explore these issues, Lange and Topel (2004) attempt
to isolate local growth in total factor productivity and to
control for local environmental factors that might affect
the unobserved skills of workers, such as changes in
schooling quality. They estimate a two-stage model of the
following form:
(8)  ln wilt = Xilt βt + Tlt  δ bc+ uit
(9)  ∆ Tlt =∆ Slt γE  + ∆δ lt βδ + η lt.
In equation (8), Tlt represents the level of total factor
productivity in state l in year t, which we estimate by
including state-by-year effects in a model of individual
wages. The parameters δ bc  are birth-state-by-cohort
effects that are meant to represent environmental fac-
tors, such as school quality, that have a common impact
across young people in state b. Importantly, census data
identify the state in which respondents were born, so
these effects are identified by people who now live
somewhere else. Intuitively, the effect asks whether indi-
viduals from “high-quality” environments earn higher
wages, on average,regardless of where they now live and
work. Equation (9) then relates the growth of total 
factor productivity between census years to growth in
education and growth in the average quality of workers,
where δ lt is the average value of δ bc among workers
residing in state l at date t. If unobserved quality matters,
and if quality is determined by state-specific environ-
mental factors, then we expect βδ > 0. Further, if unob-
served environmental factors and average schooling
attainment tend to grow together, as we might expect,
then the inclusion of ∆δ lt in equation (9) will reduce the
estimated impact of schooling growth on total factor
productivity.
This is, in fact, what happens. Figure 6 shows the rela-
tionship between long-run (60-year) changes in unob-
served skills (δ lt) and average schooling. States with
greater schooling growth also experienced an increase
in the relative quality of persons who were born in those
states. This means that growth in education and growth
in quality go hand in hand, so a simple regression of
changes in productivity on changes in education may
find externalities where none exist.
How big might this bias be? Table 3 shows estimates of
equation (9) at various growth intervals for specifica-
tions that both exclude and include ∆δ lt in the growth
model. For each growth interval the first column shows
the simple least squares regression relationship between
educational growth and growth of total factor produc-
tivity. All of these estimates of γE are numerically large,
with the biggest effects for the longest growth intervals.
For example, the 60-year estimate is 0.081, suggesting
that an additional year of education raises total factor
productivity by 8.1 percent. Adding changes in unob-
served labor force quality ∆δ l. reduces the impact of
education in each case. For the longe st (60-year) inter-
val, the point estimate falls from 0.081 to 0.023. None of
the column (2) estimates are significantly different from
zero by conventional standards—there is no persuasive
evidence that education raises total factor productivity
once growth in the unobserved quality of workers is
accounted for.This evidence does not demonstrate that
externalities are unimportant. But this evidence surely
raises doubts about the importance of externalities, esti-
mates of which are almost certainly overstated by least
squares and other methods that have been applied in
empirical studies. The evidence is that states with growing
productivity and educational attainment also attract or
produce “better” workers, and even a simple measure 
of labor force quality eliminates up to three-fourths of the
alleged relation between education and total factor pro-
ductivity. I conclude that the data on local wages and pro-
ductivity do not provide strong reasons to believe in the







Figure 6: Growth in Unobserved Skills and Growth in Schooling 1940–2000
TABLE 3: EDUCATION AND PRODUCTIVITYGROWTH: U.S. STATES 1940–2000
Notes: 
a. T-statistics in parentheses.
b. 20-year growth intervals are 1940–60, 1960–90, 1980–2000.
c. 30-year growth intervals are 1940–70, 1970–2000.
∆ Tlt =B0t + ∆ EducltB1 + ∆δ ltB2 +elt
10 year growth 20 year growthb 30 year growthc 60 year growth
∆ Educ 0.46 0.26 0.68 0.40 0.67 0.36 0.81 0.22
(2.70) (1.44) (3.57) (1.90) (3.94) (1.80) (3.86) (0.91)
∆δ l 1.23 1.08 1.01 1.35
(2.86) (2.76) (3.06) (3.64)
R2 .894 .897 .952 .954 .978 .980 .248 .415
_
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ENDNOTES
1Output and productivity data are from the Summers-
Heston Mark 5.6 (1995) files, while information on edu-
cational attainment of the labor force was collected by
Barro and Lee (1993).
2I use male wages because of vast changes in female
labor force participation over this period.
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THE SOCIAL RETURN TO SCHOOLING: WHERE
DO WE STAND?
Most economists agree that human capital is central to
economic growth and improvements in well-being. Yet
the case for active public policies that encourage invest-
ment in human capital, particularly investments in edu-
cation, rests on the seemingly plausible premise that
social returns to human capital are larger than private
ones. This paper has developed a framework for evalu-
ating the difference between private and social returns
to education, as measured by gains in wages and pro-
ductivity. I find the evidence for excess social returns is
mixed, at best. There is little compelling evidence for
positive external benefits of schooling investments;
instead, the data suggest that individuals are the main
beneficiaries of their own schooling choices.
On a more positive note, there is no empirical support
for the notion that social  returns are smaller than private
ones. This is not only evidence against the signaling view
of schooling, but important evidence that growth in edu-
cation has been an important contributor to the geo-
graphic convergence in incomes and productivities that
occurred in the United States after 1940.
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